Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions
AbstractWe derive a bound on the seller's revenue loss in optimal auctions from unanticipated bidder collusion. The relative loss is rather small when there are few bidders. It is increasing with the number of bidders but at a slow rate.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 99 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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