Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Gregory Pavlov, 2006. "Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric Auctions," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-037, Boston University - Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- John McMillan, 1991. "Dango: Japan'S Price‐Fixing Conspiracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 201-218, November.
- Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997.
"Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
- Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995. "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers 7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009.
"Auction Theory,"
Elsevier Monographs,
Elsevier,
edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973.
- R. Preston McAfee, 2002. "Coarse Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 2025-2034, September.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Koyak, Robert A. & Werden, Gregory J., 1993.
"What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 419-423.
- Werden, G.J. & Koyak, R.A. & Froeb, L.M., 1993. "What Is the Effect of Bid-Rigging on Prices," Papers 93-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June.
- Neeman, Zvika, 2003. "The effectiveness of English auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 214-238, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Heidrun Hoppe & Benny Moldovanu & Emre Ozdenoren, 2011. "Coarse matching with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 75-104, May.
- Florencia Gabrielli, 2014.
"Econometrics of First Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature,"
Económica, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, vol. 60, pages 77-118, January-D.
- Maria Florencia Gabrielli, 2023. "Econometrics of first Price Auctions: a Survey of the Theoretical and Applied Literature," Working Papers 252, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2012.
"Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
1162, The University of Melbourne.
- Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2014. "Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation," Working Papers 14-03, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2012. "Fee-Setting Mechanisms: On Optimal Pricing by Intermediaries and Indirect Taxation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 434, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2014. "The choice of the number of varieties: Justifying simple mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 7-21.
- James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2013.
"When Should Sellers Use Auctions?,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1830-1861, August.
- James W. Roberts & Andrew Sweeting, 2011. "When Should Sellers Use Auctions?," NBER Working Papers 17624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Klemperer, 2007.
"Bidding Markets,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
- Paul Klemperer, 2005. "Bidding Markets," Law and Economics 0508007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Srabana Gupta, 2001. "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(4), pages 451-465, December.
- Loyola, Gino, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083318, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023. "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- John Asker, 2010. "A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 724-762, June.
- Li, Yunan, 2017. "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 225-253.
- Katzman, Brett & Reif, Julian & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2010. "The relation between variance and information rent in auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 127-130, March.
- Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong & Roughgarden, Tim & Yan, Qiqi, 2015. "Revenue maximization with a single sample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 318-333.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006.
"Empirical Models of Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1562, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Xavier D'Haultfœuille & Philippe Février, 2020.
"The provision of wage incentives: A structural estimation using contracts variation,"
Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), pages 349-397, January.
- Xavier d'Haultfoeuille & Philippe Février, 2011. "The Provision of Wage Incentives : A Structural Estimation Using Contracts Variation," Working Papers 2011-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 271-293, September.
- Jan Palguta, 2013. "Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp483, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Bribing in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 214-228.
- Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2012.
"Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
435, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2012. "Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1163, The University of Melbourne.
- Jose Canals-Cerda, 2005. "Congestion Pricing in an Internet Market," Working Papers 05-10, NET Institute, revised Sep 2005.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:345-348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.