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The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate

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  • Nahm, Jae

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  • Nahm, Jae, 2003. "The gatekeeper's optimal fee structure when sellers can price discriminate," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 9-14, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:80:y:2003:i:1:p:9-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 2000. "A simple model of advertising and subscription fees," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 345-351, December.
    2. Baye, Michael R. & Morgan, John, 2002. "Information gatekeepers and price discrimination on the internet," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 47-51, June.
    3. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Chicken and Egg: Competing Matchmakers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899, January.

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