Information dependent games : Can common sense be common knowledge?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 27 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- J. Atsu Amegashie, 2006. "Intentions and Social Interactions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1757, CESifo Group Munich.
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