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Deterrence: Increased enforcement versus harsher penalties

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  • Pyne, Derek

Abstract

Empirical studies have found that increasing the probability of punishment has a greater effect on crime than the severity of punishment. This note explains this as the result of criminals having imperfect information on their criminal ability. As they commit crimes, they update their estimates of their ability, based on their success rate. Increased penalties deter crime in the period they are applied but offer criminals no information on their criminal ability. Crime is also deterred during a period of increased enforcement. In addition, increased enforcement leads some criminals to decrease their estimates of their ability, leading to reduced recidivism.

Suggested Citation

  • Pyne, Derek, 2012. "Deterrence: Increased enforcement versus harsher penalties," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 561-562.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:561-562
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.029
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 1997. "On criminals' risk attitudes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 97-102, August.
    3. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2010. "The Behavioral Economics of Crime and Punishment," Discussion Papers in Economics 10/14, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jul 2010.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Maennig, Wolfgang & Wilhelm, Stefan, 2023. "News and noise in crime politics: The role of announcements and risk attitudes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    2. Mungan Murat C. & Klick Jonathan, 2015. "Discounting and Criminals’ Implied Risk Preferences," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 19-23, March.
    3. Miles Stan & Pyne Derek, 2017. "The Economics of Scams," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, March.
    4. Stan Miles & Derek Pyne, 2015. "Deterring repeat offenders with escalating penalty schedules: a Bayesian approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 229-250, August.
    5. Menegatti, Mario, 2023. "Variability in punishment, risk preferences and crime deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Mungan, Murat C., 2019. "Salience and the severity versus the certainty of punishment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 95-100.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deterrence; Crime; Recidivism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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