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Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency

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  • James, Jonathan G.
  • Lawler, Phillip

Abstract

The interrelationship between monetary regime design and central bank transparency is examined. We find optimal delegation requires the central bank be either: 'representative', not choosing to publicly reveal its private information; or 'ultraconservative', deciding to be fully transparent.

Suggested Citation

  • James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2011. "Optimal delegation implications of central bank transparency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 8-11, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:1:p:8-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
    7. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2010. "Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 506-516, December.
    8. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
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