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Risk aversion, public disclosure, and partially informed outsiders

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  • Liu, Hong
  • Chai, Shujuan

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the impact of public disclosure and partially informed outsiders on a risk-averse insider’s trading behavior, market efficiency, and market depth. In our model, under disclosure requirements, except for the final auction, market depth is the same at every auction. When informed outsiders are risk-neutral, in contrast to the case of a risk-averse insider with no informed outsiders, the insider is more concerned about the uncertainty about future price risk. When the number of informed outsiders increases, market liquidity improves, and the insider increases the variance of her random component to conceal her trading strategy. However, since the insider is relatively more risk-averse, she pays less attention to doing this on her own. Besides, the order flow provided by informed outsiders and randomly added by the insider injects additional liquidity into the market. When informed outsiders are risk-averse, compared to risk-neutral informed outsiders, an insider is most concerned about trading risks brought by informed outsiders at the beginning of trading. Furthermore, whether the trader is an insider or informed outsider, the more risk-averse trader has lower expected profits. Moreover, outsiders’ greater risk aversion leads to a smaller market depth.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Hong & Chai, Shujuan, 2020. "Risk aversion, public disclosure, and partially informed outsiders," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:54:y:2020:i:c:s1062940820301728
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2020.101279
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    References listed on IDEAS

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