Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economic Modelling.
Volume (Year): 15 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411
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