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Simultaneous debt–equity holdings and corporate tax avoidance

Author

Listed:
  • Tang, Tian
  • Xu, Liang
  • Yan, Xinyan
  • Yang, Haoyi

Abstract

Dual holders, financial institutions that simultaneously hold the debt and equity claims of the same firms, increase corporate tax avoidance. The positive effect is more pronounced in firms with greater ex-ante risk-taking managerial incentives and higher short-term investor ownership. We also find that tax avoidance is associated with a lower cost of debt in the presence of dual holders. We suggest that after-tax awards are a mechanism through which dual holders influence corporate tax strategies. The evidence demonstrates that dual holding increases tax avoidance through mitigating shareholder–creditor conflicts. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and alternative tax avoidance measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Tang, Tian & Xu, Liang & Yan, Xinyan & Yang, Haoyi, 2022. "Simultaneous debt–equity holdings and corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:72:y:2022:i:c:s0929119921002765
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simultaneous debt-equity holding; Dual holding; Tax avoidance; Conflict of interest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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