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Dynamic Procedures and Incentives in Public Good Economies

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  • Chander, Parkash

Abstract

This paper considers economies involving one public good, one private good, and convex technology and proposes an informationally decentralized dynamic nontatonnement procedure that converges in general from the initial endowments to an allocation in the core. The procedure may be seen as enunciating a plausible method of cooperation among the agents for achieving an optimal provision of a public good and an equitable sharing of its cost. The viewpoint of noncooperative game theory is also considered and it is shown that there exists a trade-off between the requirements of local incentive compatibility and equitable cost sharing. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 61 (1993)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1341-54

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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:61:y:1993:i:6:p:1341-54

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Cited by:
  1. Ley, E., 1993. "On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagrammatic Exposition," Papers 93-27, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  2. de Trenqualye, Pierre, 1995. "Incentive compatibility without compensation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 35-39, January.
  3. FIGUIÈRES, Charles & VERDONCK, Magali, 2003. "On the core of an economy with multilateral and multidimensional environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 2003004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:3:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Parkash Chander, 2004. "The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 108, Econometric Society.
  7. Chander, Parkash & Thangavelu, Shandre M., 2004. "Technology adoption, education and immigration policy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 79-94, October.

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