Application of a static game of complete information: economic behaviors of professors and students
AbstractThe economic behaviors manifested between professors and students may be viewed as a game, with both behaviors endogenously correlated. In this paper, a static game is applied to address this behavior and determine the Nash equilibrium. Both professors and students choose their best strategies (i.e., optimal efforts) to maximize their payoffs. Consequently, theoretical analysis suggests that professor's evaluation and student's grade are endogenously correlated. More importantly, an innovation is offered here that is useful in constructing empirical models for the further investigation of this issue.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Economic behavior; Static game; Student evaluations of teaching;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
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- Mason, Paul M. & Steagall, Jeffrey W. & Fabritius, Michael M., 1995. "Student evaluations of faculty: A new procedure for using aggregate measures of performance," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 403-416, December.
- Krautmann, Anthony C. & Sander, William, 1999. "Grades and student evaluations of teachers," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 59-63, February.
- Michael Watts & William E. Becker, 1999.
"How Departments of Economics Evaluate Teaching,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 344-349, May.
- Paul W. Grimes & Meghan J. Millea & Thomas W. Woodruff, 2004. "Grades—Who's to Blame? Student Evaluation of Teaching and Locus of Control," Journal of Economic Education, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 35(2), pages 129-147, April.
- Paul Isely & Harinder Singh, 2005. "Do Higher Grades Lead to Favorable Student Evaluations?," Journal of Economic Education, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 36(1), pages 29-42, January.
- Tin-chun Lin, 2009. "Implications of grade inflation: knowledge illusion and economic inefficiency in the knowledge market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2314-2324.
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