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A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing

Author

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  • Justin Ross

    (School of Public & Environmental Affairs - Indiana University, Bloomington)

Abstract

This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives d by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Justin Ross, 2008. "A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(29), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08i20014
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume9/EB-08I20014A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ross Guest, 2001. "The Instructor's Optimal Mix of Teaching Methods," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 313-326.
    2. Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Wilson, Deborah & Slater, Helen, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Deborah Wilson & Bronwyn Croxson & Adele Atkinson, 2004. "“What Gets Measured Gets Done”: Headteachers’ Responses to the English Secondary School," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/107, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    4. Brian A. Jacob, 2002. "Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools," NBER Working Papers 8968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Brown, Byron W & Saks, Daniel H, 1975. "The Production and Distribution of Cognitive Skills within Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(3), pages 571-593, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua C. Hall, 2015. "Higher Education Accreditation: Market Regulation or Government Regulation Revisited," Working Papers 15-42, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Standardized Testing;

    JEL classification:

    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

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