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Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools

Author

Listed:
  • Burgess, Simon
  • Propper, Carol
  • Wilson, Deborah
  • Slater, Helen

Abstract

In 1988 the UK government introduced greater accountability into the English state school sector. But the information that schools are required to make public on their pupil achievement is only partial. The paper examines whether accountability measures based on a partial summary of student achievement influence the distribution of student achievement. Since school ratings only incorporate test results via pass rates, schools have incentives to improve the performance of students who are on the margin of meeting these standards, to the detriment of very low achieving or high achieving pupils. Using pupil level data for a cohort of all students in secondary public sector schools in England, we find that this policy reduces the educational gains and exam performance in high stakes exams of very low ability students.

Suggested Citation

  • Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Wilson, Deborah & Slater, Helen, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5248
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    1. Andy Wiggins & Peter Tymms, 2002. "Dysfunctional Effects of League Tables: A Comparison Between English and Scottish Primary Schools," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 43-48, January.
    2. Julie Berry Cullen & Randall Reback, 2006. "Tinkering Toward Accolades: School Gaming Under a Performance Accountability System," NBER Working Papers 12286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Deborah Wilson, 2004. "Which Ranking? The Impact of a 'Value-Added' Measure of Secondary School Performance," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 37-45.
    4. Glennerster, Howard, 1991. "Quasi-markets for Education?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1268-1276, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    School accountability; High stakes exams; Educational value added;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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