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Income inequality, redistribution and democratization

Author

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  • Bi Zhaohui

    (Kobe University, Japan)

Abstract

We consider that in a society, there are conflicts of income redistribution between the rich (class) and the poor (one), and the extent of income inequality s conflict between these two groups in the society, bringing to a revolution aimed for more redistribution. In our model, we assume that there are two types of poor: weak and strong. The difference between the weak type and the strong type is that the later can win through a revolution, but the former can not. However, this is the private information of the poor and is not observed by the rich. When income inequality increases, with this asymmetry of information, the weak type of the poor is more likely to attempt a revolution. As a result, larger inequality results in higher probability of democratization.

Suggested Citation

  • Bi Zhaohui, 2007. "Income inequality, redistribution and democratization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(35), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d70012
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Oligarchy, democracy, inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 285-313, August.
    2. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A., 2000. "Democratization or repression?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 683-693, May.
    3. Falkinger, Josef, 1999. "Social instability and redistribution of income," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 35-51, March.
    4. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    5. Adam Przeworski, 2005. "Democracy as an equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 253-273, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eiji Yamamura, 2014. "Comparing the influence of conflict on the perceptions of rich and poor: testing the hypothesis of Acemoglu and Robinson," ISER Discussion Paper 0911, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democratization;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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