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Two-sided Matching, Who Marries Whom? And what Happens upon Divorce?

Author

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  • Terence Tai-Leung Chong

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a less-developed country.

Suggested Citation

  • Terence Tai-Leung Chong, 2006. "Two-sided Matching, Who Marries Whom? And what Happens upon Divorce?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(21), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d00005
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1, July.
    2. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April.
    3. Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-1187, December.
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    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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