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Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model

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  • BARBIER-GAUCHARD Amélie

    (Laboratoire dEconomie d'Orléans)

Abstract

What is the optimal way to stabilize shocks and to take care of fiscal discipline in a fiscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for fiscal discipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves significantly the union's social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the output gap and correct national preferences.

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  • BARBIER-GAUCHARD Amélie, 2005. "Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(7), pages 1.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05aa0007
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    1. Amélie BARBIER-GAUCHARD, 2020. "Blueprint for the European Fiscal Union: State of knowledge and Challenges," Working Papers of BETA 2020-39, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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