Fiscal Federalism, EMU and Shock Absorption Mechanisms: A Guide to the Literature
AbstractFiscal federalism theory seeks to establish the optimal organization of a government, confined by certain geographic boundaries. The implications of that theory for the monetary unification process are shortly inquired. The literature measuring the redistribution and stabilization effects of the tax and transfer systems in different monetary unions is surveyed. The prospects of evolution to integration models with a federalist countenance are briefly analysed and it is given special attention to the projects of creation of a European Fiscal Transfers Scheme. That mechanism would provide the European economies with some degree of stabilization in substitution for the loss of the adjustment mechanisms. However, after analysing the different proposals for the creation of such mechanism we conclude that, given the shocks persistence, they easily become redistribution mechanisms.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A) in its journal European Integration online Papers (EIoP).
Volume (Year): 4 (2000)
Issue (Month): (03)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hughes Hallett, A J & Ma, Yue, 1993. "East Germany, West Germany, and Their Mezzogiorno Problem: A Parable for European Economic Integration," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(417), pages 416-28, March.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991.
"Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Asdrubali, Pierfederico & Sorensen, Bent E & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963-1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1081-1110, November.
- Mario Forni & Lucrezia Reichlin, 1999.
"Risk and potential insurance in Europe,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/10145, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Kenen,Peter B., 2000. "The International Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644358.
- Hammond, George & von Hagen, JÃ¼rgen, 1995.
"Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks. An Empirical Study for the European Community,"
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
1170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- von Hagen, Jurgen & Hammond, George W, 1998. "Regional Insurance against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, University of Manchester, vol. 66(3), pages 331-53, June.
- Paul R. Masson & Mark P. Taylor, 1993. "Fiscal Policy within Common Currency Areas," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 29-44, 03.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Editorial Assistant).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.