Quelle cible de déficit dans la zone euro ?. Les enseignements d'un modèle à deux pays
AbstractThis paper proposes a static model of a monetary union of two countries subject to symmetric and asymmetric shocks as an attempt to establish the relevance of the propositions concerning the structural deficit target for the Euro zone. Our model shows that the choice of the deficit target depends heavily on both the Central Bank preferencies and the sign and scope of the fiscal policy spillovers between the Union members.Classification JEL : E 52, E 62, E 63, F 42
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 54 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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- BARBIER-GAUCHARD Amélie, 2005. "Fiscal federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(11), pages 1-8.
- Amélie Barbier-Gauchard, 2005. "Fiscal Federalism, discipline and selection adverse in the EU : Lessons from a theoretical model," Post-Print halshs-00007797, HAL.
- Schalck, Christophe, 2006. "Règles Budgétaires et Gestion du Policy-Mix dans l'UEM Budgetary Rules and Management of the Policy-Mix in the UME," MPRA Paper 1434, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
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