Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom
AbstractThis paper argues that there is no race to the bottom when the social planner adopts a Rawlsian criterion, only the poor are mobile and they do not work at the optimal tax outcome. This argument is developed within a two skill-model of optimal income taxation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 8 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- HAMILTON, Jon & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Rawlsian governments and the race to the bottom," CORE Discussion Papers RP, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1649, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Gwenael Piaser, 2003.
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Public Economics, EconWPA
- PIASER, Gwenaël, 2003. "Labor mobility and income tax competition," CORE Discussion Papers, UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2003006, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Craig Brett & John Weymark, 2008.
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Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics
0812, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
- Felix Bierbrauer & Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2011. "Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility," CESifo Working Paper Series 3329, CESifo Group Munich.
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