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On the choice of incentives in firms: influence activity, monitoring technology and organizational structure

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Author Info
Marco Delmastro () (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato)

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Abstract

Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions have recently provided evidence on part of this literature, especially as concerned the trade-off between incentives and insurance. However there is still much to do in order to offer a complete picture of firm's incentive system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a test to factors that have been usually underrepresented in empirical work but that may be key in favoring or inhibiting the introduction of performance bonuses.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 12 (2002)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 1-13
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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01l20002

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Related research
Keywords: influence activity; monetary incentives; monitoring technology; organizational structure;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Colombo, Massimo G. & Delmastro, Marco, 1999. "Some stylized facts on organization and its evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 255-274, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ichniowski, Casey & Shaw, Kathryn & Prennushi, Giovanna, 1997. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 291-313, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 2000. "Multitask Learning and the Reorganization of Work: From Tayloristic to Holistic Organization," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. David Neumark & Peter Cappelli, 1999. "Do "High Performance" Work Practices Improve Establishment-Level Outcomes?," NBER Working Papers 7374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Gibbons, Robert, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-32, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Timothy Dunne, 1994. "Plant Age and Technology Use in US. Manufacturing Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 488-499, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. FitzRoy, Felix R. & Kraft, Kornelius, 1995. "On the choice of incentives in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 145-160, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Inderst, Roman & Müller, Holger M. & Wärneryd, Karl, 2000. "Influence Costs and Hierarchy," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 392, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Delmastro, Marco, 2002. "The determinants of the management hierarchy: evidence from Italian plants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 119-137, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Thomas N. Hubbard, 1998. "Why Are Process Monitoring Technologies Valuable? The Use of On-Board Information Technology in the Trucking Industry," NBER Working Papers 6482, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Perri, Timothy J., 1994. "Influence activity and executive compensation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 169-181, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Canice Prendergast, 1996. "What Happens Within Firms? A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Compensation Policies," NBER Working Papers 5802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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