Influence activity and executive compensation
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 24 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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- Marco Delmastro, 2002. "On the choice of incentives in firms: influence activity, monitoring technology and organizational structure," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(2), pages 1-13.
- Kraft, Kornelius & Niederprum, Antonia, 1999. "Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 17-27, September.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:2:p:1-13 is not listed on IDEAS
- Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2009.
"Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 372-383, August.
- Czarnitzki, Dirk & Kraft, Kornelius, 2004. "Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-75, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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