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Nash Bargaining versus Market Outcomes

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Author Info

  • Nirvikar Singh

    (Department of Economics, Social Sciences 1 University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA)

Abstract

This paper compares the Nash Bargaining Solution and market outcomes in a simple n-person exchange economy. It shows how the two outcomes differ with respect toresponsiveness of equilibrium to differences in the curvature of the utility function, in endowments, and in market positions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its journal Indian Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 23-35

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Handle: RePEc:dse:indecr:v:40:y:2005:i:1:p:23-35

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Related research

Keywords: Nash Bargaining Solution; Competitive Equilibrium; Risk Aression;

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References

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  1. Binmore, Ken G & Herrero, M J, 1988. "Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 17-31, January.
  2. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
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Cited by:
  1. Delacote, Philippe & Simonet, Gabriela, 2013. "Readiness and Avoided deforestation policies: on the use of the REDD fund," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/12984, Paris Dauphine University.

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