Dezentralisierung und Korruption: erste Erfahrungen aus Indonesien
AbstractWe analyze the effect of decentralization on the corruption level for the Indonesian example. From a theoretical perspective this effect is undetermined a priori - decentralization brings the decision-making process closer to the people and thus facilitates participation and accountability and sets off an interjurisdictional competition, which both tends to lower corruption. However, in developing countries local political processes are often less transparent and administrations suffer from severe capacity constraints and inefficiencies. We analyze the impact effects of Indonesia's far-reaching decentralization in 2001 on corruption through a very encompassing survey and find that the overall level has remained unaltered, but that corruption has shifted to those institutions that have gained power. We also investigate the determinants of local corruption levels which differ very substantially across Indonesia. Wir analysieren die Wirkung der Dezentralisierung auf die Korruption am Beispiel Indonesiens. Aus theoretischer Sicht ist der Effekt unbestimmt: Zwar erhöht die größere Nähe der Betroffenen zu den Entscheidungsprozessen ihre Eingriffs- und Partizipationsmöglichkeiten, und auch der interjurisdiktionelle Wettbewerb senkt tendenziell das Korruptionsniveau, doch ist in Entwicklungsländern auf der lokalen Ebene der politische Prozess oft weniger transparent und die Bürokratie ineffizienter. Wir untersuchen mithilfe einer umfangreichen Befragung die ersten Erfahrungen Indonesiens, das 2001 eine sehr weitreichende Dezentralisierung implementiert hat, und finden, dass das durchschnittliche Korruptionsniveau wenig verändert ist, aber sich die Korruption systematisch zu den Institutionen verlagert hat, deren Entscheidungskompetenzen sich vergrößert haben. Schließlich analysieren wir die Determinanten der regional sehr unterschiedlichen Korruptionsniveaus.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.
Volume (Year): 73 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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