IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jechis/v67y2007i01p191-226_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps

Author

Listed:
  • Casari, Marco

Abstract

This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 communities. Over time, private-order institutions in the form of charters replaced informal arrangements sustained by the long-run interaction among villagers. Although costly to run, the charters accomplished several tasks that increased resource use efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Casari, Marco, 2007. "Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(1), pages 191-226, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:01:p:191-226_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022050707000071/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hoang-Anh Ho, 2020. "Tying peasants to their land: The rise and fall of private property rights in historical Vietnam," eabh Papers 20-01, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    2. Jens Prüfer, 2016. "Business Associations and Private Ordering," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 306-358.
    3. van Bavel, Bas, 2016. "The Invisible Hand?: How Market Economies have Emerged and Declined Since AD 500," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199608133, Decembrie.
    4. Trevor Breen & Alessandro Tavoni, 2020. "Guards vs Vigilantes: The Effect of Rule Enforcement Strategies on Sustainable Use Norms in Common Property Regimes," Working Papers wp1157, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    5. McCarthy, Jack & Bonnin, Christine & Meredith, David, 2018. "Disciplining the State: The role of alliances in contesting multi-level agri-environmental governance," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 317-328.
    6. Steven Nafziger, 2016. "Communal property rights and land redistributions in Late Tsarist Russia," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(3), pages 773-800, August.
    7. Miguel Laborda Pemán & Tine De Moor, 2012. "A Tale of Two Commons: Some Preliminary Hypotheses on the Long-Term Development of the Commons in Western and Eastern Europe, 1000-1900," Working Papers 0031, Utrecht University, Centre for Global Economic History.
    8. M. Casari & M. Lisciandra, 2013. "Gender Discrimination in Property Rights," Working Papers wp914, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Pier Angelo MORI, 2014. "Community And Cooperation: The Evolution Of Cooperatives Towards New Models Of Citizens' Democratic Participation In Public Services Provision," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 85(3), pages 327-352, September.
    10. Andrea Bonoldi & Chiara Dalle Nogare & Martin Mosler & Niklas Potrafke, 2020. "Do inheritance rules affect voter turnout? Evidence from an Alpine region," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 395-445, December.
    11. Goeschl, Timo & Haberl, Beatrix & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "How to Organize Monitoring and Punishment: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0737, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    12. Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio, 2014. "Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources: a Model," MPRA Paper 57712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio, 2015. "Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources," IZA Discussion Papers 9601, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Francesco GUALA, 2010. "Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate," Departmental Working Papers 2010-23, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    15. Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio & Tagliapietra, Claudio, 2019. "Property Rights, Marriage, and Fertility in the Italian Alps, 1790–1820," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 72-92.
    16. Gatto, Paola & Bogataj, Nevenka, 2015. "Disturbances, robustness and adaptation in forest commons: Comparative insights from two cases in the Southeastern Alps," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 56-64.
    17. Katia Laura Sidali & Achim Spiller, 2014. "Cultural property rights in the eu geographical indications? system: Cui prodest?," Economia agro-alimentare, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 16(2), pages 97-104.
    18. Ivo Baur & Heinrich H. Nax, 2018. "Adapting Governance Incentives to Avoid Common Pool Resource Underuse: The Case of Swiss Summer Pastures," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(11), pages 1-20, October.
    19. Marco Setti & Matteo Garuti, 2018. "Identity, Commons and Sustainability: An Economic Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-12, February.
    20. Baur, Ivo & Binder, Claudia R., 2015. "Modeling and assessing scenarios of common property pastures management in Switzerland," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 292-305.
    21. Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija & Pafilis, Evagelos, 2020. "Common ownership of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 555-578.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:01:p:191-226_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jeh .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.