Debt, deficits, and crowding out: England, 1727 1840
Abstract
By the 1820s, as a result of the protracted struggle with France, the market value of the British Government debt was twice British GDP. It has been argued that this debt represented a huge institutional failure by the government, significantly slowing growth in the Industrial Revolution period by crowding out private investment. This article constructs measures of private rates of return in the years 1725 1839 and shows these imply that neither the government deficits nor the mounting debt are associated with much higher private rates of return on capital. The reason the government could issue so much debt without raising rates of return is unclear. One possibility is that crowding out was occurring, but population growth in 1770 1839 was reducing rental income as a fraction of GDP, creating a demand for other asset income so that we do not observe tightness in capital markets.Download Info
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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal European Review of Economic History.
Volume (Year): 5 (2001)
Issue (Month): 03 (December)
Pages: 403-436
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- David R Stead, . "Fixed Rent Contracts in English Agriculture, 1750-1850: A Conjecture," Discussion Papers 05/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Peter Temin & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2004.
"Credit Rationing and Crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862,"
Working Papers
211, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Temin, Peter & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2005. "Credit rationing and crowding out during the industrial revolution: evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 325-348, July.
- Peter Temin & Joachim Voth, 2004. "Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862," Economics Working Papers 859, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2005.
- Temin, Peter & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2004. "Credit Rationing and Crowding-Out During the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862," CEPR Discussion Papers 4453, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mikael Priks, 2005. "Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 1464, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michael Bar & Oksana Leukhina, 2009.
"Supplemental Notes to "Demographic transition and industrial revolution: A macroeconomic investigation","
Technical Appendices
08-85, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Michael Bar & Oksana Leukhina, 2010. "Demographic Transition and Industrial Revolution: A Macroeconomic Investigation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 424-451, April.
- Voth, Joachim, 2005. "Credit Rationing and Crowding Out During the Industrial Revolution," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qw3v8q6, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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