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Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan

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Author Info

  • Takero Doi

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University
    Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California)

  • Toshihiro Ihori

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Tokyo)

  • Hiroki Kondo

    ()
    (Department of Econmics, Shinshu University)

Abstract

We investigate the behavior of government deficits and fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan both theoretically and empirically. We first develop a dynamic framework of fiscal reconstruction process using the dynamic game theory among various interest groups. The distribution of a tax increase, that is, contribution of taxes to reducing public debt and raising privileges, depends on the political efficiency of lobbying activities. We also investigate empirically the relationship between the political inefficiency and the outcome of fiscal reconstruction process in the Japanese (national) general account.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 169-183

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Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2002:v:3:i:1:p:169-183

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Related research

Keywords: Government deficits; Fiscal reconstruction; Political inefficiency;

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References

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  1. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 144, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  2. Ihori, Toshihiro & Itaya, Jun-ichi, 2001. "A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 779-797, November.
  3. Boadway,Robin & Pestieau,Pierre & Wildasin,David, 1986. "Tax-transfer policies and the voluntary provision of public goods," Discussion Paper Serie A 130, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed?," NBER Working Papers 3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. V.V. Chari & Harold Cole, 1993. "Why are representative democracies fiscally irresponsible?," Staff Report 163, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Andres Velasco, 1997. "A Model of Endogenous Fiscal Deficits and Delayed Fiscal Reforms," NBER Working Papers 6336, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Doi, Takero & Ihori, Toshihiro, 2002. "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 492-511, December.
  2. Denis Nitikin & Chunli Shen & Qian Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2012. "Water Service Delivery Reform in China: Safeguarding the Interests of the Poor," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 13(2), pages 463-487, November.
  3. Denis Nitikin & Chunli Shen & Qian Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2011. "Land Taxation in China: Assessment of Prospects for Politically and Economically Sustainable Reform," CEMA Working Papers 431, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.

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