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A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction

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  • Ihori, Toshihiro

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.)

  • Jun-ichi Itaya

    (Otaru university of Faculty of Commerce.)

Abstract

This paper investigates dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction by analysing the infinite duration dynamic game among various interest groups with a framework of voluntary acceptance of tax burden. By comparing the first best solution, the open-loop solution under enforceable commitments, and the closed-loop solution without commitment, we explore the free riding aspect of fiscal reconstruction process and investigate the normative role of consumption taxes to internalize the free riding problem. We also derive explicitly the adjustment speeds of fiscal reconstruction under alternative solutions and examine the impact of consumption taxes on the adjustmet speed.

Suggested Citation

  • Ihori, Toshihiro & Jun-ichi Itaya, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Fiscal Reconstruction," CIRJE F-Series 97-F-15, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:97f15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Ihori & Jun-Ichi Itaya, 2004. "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Government Financing," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(1), pages 55-67, January.
    2. Doi, Takero & Ihori, Toshihiro, 2002. "Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Interest Groups in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 492-511, December.
    3. Toshihiro Ihori, 2006. "Fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction in Japan," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(4), pages 489-508, August.
    4. Javier Frutos & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2018. "Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 620-636, September.
    5. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2011. "A simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with private savings and local borrowing regulation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 15-24, July.
    6. Toshihiro Ihori, 2014. "Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-920, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Huang, Yuankan & Inohara, Takehiro, 2015. "Steady-state stock and group size: An approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 270(C), pages 505-510.
    8. Ishida, Ryo & Oguro, Kazumasa, 2018. "The viability of a voting system that allocates parliamentary seats according to life expectancy: An analysis using OLG models," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 51-57.
    9. Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori & Hiroki Kondo, 2002. "Government Deficits, Political Inefficiency, and Fiscal Reconstruction in Japan," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 3(1), pages 169-183, May.
    10. Kazumasa Oguro & Motohiro Sato, 2014. "Public debt accumulation and fiscal consolidation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(7), pages 663-673, March.

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