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Targeting Tax Relief at Youth Employment

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  • Matthew D. Webb
  • Arthur Sweetman
  • Casey Warman

Abstract

Canada's Youth Hires program was a targeted employment subsidy that rebated employment insurance premiums to employers with net increases in insurable earnings for youths aged 18-24 years. Using a difference-in-differences approach, in each of two data sets statistically and economically significant employment impacts are observed. Most of the evidence suggests that the 2-2.4 weeks of increased employment resulted from an aggregate reduction in those not in the labour force, with at most a modest change in the unemployment rate. Many estimated effects are larger for men than for women. Notably, strong evidence of displacement (substitution away from slightly older non-subsidized workers) is not observed. However, there may be a small reduction in full-time schooling for the targeted group.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew D. Webb & Arthur Sweetman & Casey Warman, 2016. "Targeting Tax Relief at Youth Employment," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 42(4), pages 415-430, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:42:y:2016:i:4:p:415-430
    DOI: 10.3138/cpp.2014-070
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    Cited by:

    1. Albanese, Andrea & Cockx, B. & Dejemeppe, Muriel, 2023. "Long-term effects of hiring subsidies for low-educated unemployed youths," ROA Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
    2. Andrea Albanese & Bart Cockx & Muriel Dejemeppe, 2022. "Long-Term Effects of Hiring Subsidies for Unemployed Youths—Beware of Spillovers," CESifo Working Paper Series 9972, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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