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Is institutional efficiency in independent central banking a communicative matter?

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  • Carlo Tognato

Abstract

Tradicionalmente, los economistas políticos han sido indiferentes a la construcción comunicativa del dinero y la banca central en la esfera pública. Esta no les importa cuando los asuntos monetarios se convierten en un juego racional encaminado a preservar el valor de la moneda o toman la forma de un juego de moral medieval. Este artículo sugiere que la economía política de la independencia del banco central exige alejarse de dicha práctica. Argumenta que la coordinación comunicativa del juego monetario es esencial para saber de qué manera los bancos centrales independientes pueden lograr la efi ciencia institucional y por qué no enfrentan un trade-off entre efi ciencia institucional y legitimidad democrática. Sugiere, en particular, que un banco central institucionalmente efi ciente no puede actuar más que como un agente de empoderamiento comunicativo para la audiencia proporcionándole el contexto local para sus actividades.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlo Tognato, 2005. "Is institutional efficiency in independent central banking a communicative matter?," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000093:002925
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank.
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    3. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    independent central bank; communication; democracy.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E59 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Other

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