Although much has been written about monopoly extraction of natural resources, the case of a resource being sold in two separate markets has escaped notice. We find that a monopolist facing two different iso-elastic demand schedules extracts more rapidly than the social planner, whether or not arbitrage prevents price discrimination between markets.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2004) Issue (Month): 1 (February) Pages: 178-188 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
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