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Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: Are subsidies necessary?

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  • Daubanes, Julien

Abstract

This note reconsiders the optimal taxation problem when extraction of an exhaustible resource is monopolistic. In a standard model, I explicitly characterize and examine all the efficiency-inducing paths of taxes/subsidies on the resource. Consistently with the literature, there is a family of such optimal paths. In contrast with Im (2002), it may not be necessary to subsidize the monopoly at any date: within the family of optimal paths of taxes/subsidies, there may exist some paths along which the regulator raises positive revenues at all dates. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing efficiency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Daubanes, Julien, 2011. "Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: Are subsidies necessary?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 399-403, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:33:y:2011:i:3:p:399-403
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Exhaustible resources Optimal taxation Imperfect competition;

    JEL classification:

    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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