Endogenous Timing in Games of Commercial Policy
AbstractThis paper analyzes various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context of noncooperative policy games with endogenous timing. It is shown that, while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play, that is not necessarily the case in tariff games. One implication of the analysis is that, in contrast to existing theory, trade is not eliminated in quota games. Another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs. The paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously. This paper analyses various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context on non-cooperative policy games with endogenous timing. It is shown that, while the subgame perfect equilibria in quota games always involve sequential play, that is not necessarily the case in tariff games. One implication of the analysis is that, in contrast to existing theory, trade is not eliminated in quota games. Another implication is that quotas are not necessarily inferior to tariffs. The paper also examines the ways policy leaders and followers differ in their preferences over instruments and allows the choice over instruments to be determined endogenously.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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