Optimal Taxation and Heterogeneous Oligopoly
AbstractThis paper examines the effects of firm-specific taxes on an oligopoly composed of firms of unequal sizes, holding different conjectures, operating with nonidentical costs. Four types of effects are analyzed: on profits, on industry concentration, on total tax revenue, and on social welfare. The author derives (1) the revenue-maximizing taxes, (2) the welfare-maximizing taxes, and (3) welfare-maximizing taxes subject to a revenue constraint.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 26 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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