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Analysis of the use of benefits under Chilean unemployment insurance

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  • Eduardo Fajnzylber R.
  • Isabel Poblete H.

Abstract

This paper intends to characterize the take-up behavior of benefits in the Chilean Unemployment Insurance scheme. Using administrative data, we observe that only 35% of eligible individuals apply for some of the benefits covered by the program. The results suggest that an important part of the low take-up rate stems from rational decisions of well-informed agents. However, variables that seek to measure the available information to the participant show a significant and positive correlation with the take-up behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Fajnzylber R. & Isabel Poblete H., 2013. "Analysis of the use of benefits under Chilean unemployment insurance," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 16(3), pages 32-68, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchec:v:16:y:2013:i:3:p:32-68
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hartley, Gonzalo Reyes & van Ours, Jan C. & Vodopivec, Milan, 2011. "Incentive effects of unemployment insurance savings accounts: Evidence from Chile," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 798-809.
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    3. Rebecca M. Blank & David E. Card, 1991. "Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1157-1189.
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    5. Virginia Hernanz & Franck Malherbet & Michele Pellizzari, 2004. "Take-Up of Welfare Benefits in OECD Countries: A Review of the Evidence," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 17, OECD Publishing.
    6. Eduardo Fajnzylber & Isabel Poblete, 2010. "Un Modelo de Proyección para el Seguro de Cesantía," Working Papers 41, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised May 2010.
    7. Solange Berstein & Guillermo Larraín & Francisco Pino, 2005. "Cobertura, densidad y pensiones en Chile: Proyecciones a 20 años plazo," Working Papers 12, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Nov 2005.
    8. Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 913-937.
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    10. Solange Berstein & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Pamela Gana & Isabel Poblete, 2007. "Cinco Años de Funcionamiento del Seguro de Cesantía en Chile," Working Papers 23, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Dec 2007.
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