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Mehr oder weniger Populismus? Wie wäre die Bundestagswahl 2017 ohne das Mindestwahlalter von 18 Jahren ausgegangen?

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  • Felix Rösel

Abstract

Kinder und Jugendliche sind bei Bundestagswahlen nicht wahlberechtigt. Dies wird zumeist mit fehlender politischer Reife begründet. In diesem Artikel simulieren wir, wie die Bundestagswahl 2017 ohne das Mindestwahlalter von 18 Jahren ausgegangen wäre („Kinderwahlrecht“). Wir nutzen Daten der sogenannten Junior- und U18-Wahl, an der sich im Jahr 2017 über eine Million Kinder und Jugendliche unter 18 Jahren beteiligt haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen überraschende Auswirkungen der Abschaffung der Altersgrenze auf das Wahlergebnis: Parteien der demokratischen Mitte wären gestärkt worden, während Parteien am linken und am rechten politischen Rand an Zustimmung verloren hätten. Die AfD hätte beispielsweise zwei Bundestagsmandate weniger erhalten, wären Kinder und Jugendliche stimmberechtigt gewesen.

Suggested Citation

  • Felix Rösel, 2017. "Mehr oder weniger Populismus? Wie wäre die Bundestagswahl 2017 ohne das Mindestwahlalter von 18 Jahren ausgegangen?," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 24(06), pages 03-06, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodre:v:24:y:2017:i:06:p:03-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner & Uebelmesser, Silke, 2003. "Pensions and the path to gerontocracy in Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 153-158, March.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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