Community tax evasion models: A stochastic dominance test
AbstractIn a multi community environment local authorities compete for tax base. When monitoring is imperfect, agents may decide not to pay in their community (evasion), and save the tax difference. The agent decision on where to pay taxes is based on the probability of getting caught, the fine he eventually will have to pay and the time cost of paying in a neighbor community. First, we prove that if the focus of the agents’ decision is the probability of getting caught and the fine, only the richest people evade. If instead, the key ingredient is the time cost of evading, only the poorest cheat. Second, we test the evasion pattern on the Automobile Registration System in Uruguay using two stochastic dominance tests. The evidence favors in this case the hypothesis that richer people are the evaders.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Universidad del CEMA in its journal Journal of Applied Economics.
Volume (Year): VIII (2005)
Issue (Month): (November)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Av. Córdoba 374, (C1054AAP) Capital Federal
Phone: (5411) 6314-3000
Fax: (5411) 4314-1654
Web page: http://www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/jae.html
More information through EDIRC
tax evasion; stochastic dominance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size,"
819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
- F. Thomas Juster & Paul Wachtel, 1974.
"Anticipatory and Objective Models of Durable Goods Demand,"
in: Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 1, number 2, pages 136-188
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juster, F Thomas & Wachtel, Paul, 1972. "Anticipatory and Objective Models of Durable Goods Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 564-79, September.
- Yoon-Jae Whang & Esfandiar Maasoumi & Oliver Linton, 2004.
"Consistent Testing for Stochastic Dominance: A Subsampling Approach,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp508, Financial Markets Group.
- Oliver Linton & Esfandiar Maasoumi & Whang, Yoon-Jae, 2002. "Consistent Testing for Stochastic Dominance: A Subsampling Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1356, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2002.
- Oliver Linton & Esfandiar Maasoumi & Yoon-Jae Wang, 2002. "Consistent testing for stochastic dominance: a subsampling approach," CeMMAP working papers CWP03/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Oliver Linton & Esfandiar Maasoumi & Yoon-Jae Whang, 2002. "Consistent Testing for Stochastic Dominance: A Subsampling Approach," STICERD - Econometrics Paper Series /2002/433, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Oliver Linton & Esfandiar Maasoumi & Yoon-Jae Whang, 2002. "Consistent Testing for Stochastic Dominance: A Subsampling Approach," FMG Discussion Papers dp407, Financial Markets Group.
- Levy, Haim, 1994. "Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion: An Experimental Study," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 289-307, May.
- Hess, Alan C, 1977. "A Comparison of Automobile Demand Equations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 683-701, April.
- Anderson, Gordon, 1996. "Nonparametric Tests of Stochastic Dominance in Income Distributions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1183-93, September.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416.
- Wilson, John Douglas, 1991.
"Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
- Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
- Friend, Irwin & Blume, Marshall E, 1975. "The Demand for Risky Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 900-922, December.
- Saba, Richard P, et al, 1995. "The Demand for Cigarette Smuggling," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 189-202, April.
- Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
- Cohn, Richard A, et al, 1975. "Individual Investor Risk Aversion and Investment Portfolio Composition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 605-20, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valeria Dowding).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.