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Knut Wicksell: Zum Geburtstag des Begründers einer kritischen Vertragstheorie

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  • Markt Jörg

Abstract

On the occasion of his 150th birthday this paper serves the purpose of honouring Knut Wicksell. First, the life and work of Wicksell is portrayed. Subsequently, the attention is directed to his central contribution to the theory of taxation. The contemporary economic contract theory mainly rests upon the principle of unanimity developed by Wicksell. This principle is apt to guide the citizens’ search for mutual gains from cooperation through the provision of public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Markt Jörg, 2001. "Knut Wicksell: Zum Geburtstag des Begründers einer kritischen Vertragstheorie," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 52(1), pages 189-214, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:52:y:2001:i:1:p:189-214:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2001-0113
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