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Taxing education in Ramsey's tradition

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  • Richter, Wolfram F.

Abstract

Assuming a two-period model with endogenous choices of labour, education, and saving, it is shown to be second-best efficient to deviate from Ramsey's Rule and to distort qualified labour less than nonqualified labour. Furthermore, if the earnings function displays constant elasticity, the choice of education should not be distorted. With the necessary qualifications the results extend to the case when taxpayers are heterogeneous and when the planner trades off efficiency against equity.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 93 (2009)
Issue (Month): 11-12 (December)
Pages: 1254-1260

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:11-12:p:1254-1260

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords: Endogenous choice of education; labour; and saving Second-best efficient taxation Linear instruments Finite periods Ramsey's Rule Power Law of Learning;

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References

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  1. Wolfram F. Richter, 2009. "Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition," CESifo Working Paper Series 2586, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Wolfram F. Richter & Christoph Braun, 2010. "Efficient Subsidization of Human Capital Accumulation with Overlapping Generations and Endogenous Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2982, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Hartog,Joop & Maassen van den Brink,Henriëtte (ed.), 2007. "Human Capital," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521873161.
  4. Bovenberg, A.L. & Jacobs, B., 2001. "Redistribution and Education Subsidies are Siamese Twins," Discussion Paper 2001-82, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Dan Anderberg, 2008. "Optimal Policy and the Risk Properties of Human Capital Reconsidered," CESifo Working Paper Series 2451, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., . "Investment in education and the time inconsistency of redistributive tax policy," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1219, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Bas Jacobs & A. Lans Bovenberg, 2011. "Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the Earnings Function," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(6), pages 957-971, December.
  8. Sandmo, Agnar, 1974. "A Note on the Structure of Optimal Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 701-06, September.
  9. Trostel, Philip A, 1993. "The Effect of Taxation on Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(2), pages 327-50, April.
  10. Wolfram F. Richter, 2006. "Taxing Human Capital Efficiently: The Double Dividend of Taxing Non-qualified Labour more Heavily than Qualified Labour," CESifo Working Paper Series 1832, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1972. "The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 97-119, April.
  12. Andersson, Fredrik & Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-01, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  13. Berthold U. Wigger, 2004. "Are Higher Education Subsidies Second Best?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(1), pages 65-82, 03.
  14. Wolfram F. Richter, 2007. "Efficient Tax Policy Ranks Education Higher than Saving," CESifo Working Paper Series 2106, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
  16. Nielsen, Soren Bo & Sorensen, Peter Birch, 1997. "On the optimality of the Nordic system of dual income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 311-329, February.
  17. Larry E. Jones & Rodolfo E. Manuelli & Peter E. Rossi, 1993. "On the Optimal Taxation of Capital Income," NBER Working Papers 4525, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Bovenberg, A Lans & Jacobs, Bas, 2005. "Human Capital and Optimal Positive Taxation of Capital Income," CEPR Discussion Papers 5047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Hartog,Joop & Maassen van den Brink,Henriëtte (ed.), 2009. "Human Capital," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521117562.
  20. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  21. Costa, Carlos Eugênio da & Maestri, Lucas Jóver, 2004. "The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 554, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Richter, Wolfram F., 2013. "Mincer Equation, Power Law of Learning, and Efficient Education Policy," IZA Discussion Papers 7280, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Student loans in a tiebout model of higher education," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 137, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
  3. Wolfram F. Richter, 2009. "Taxing Education in Ramsey's Tradition," CESifo Working Paper Series 2586, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Wolfram F. Richter & Christoph Braun, 2010. "Efficient Subsidization of Human Capital Accumulation with Overlapping Generations and Endogenous Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2982, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. repec:got:cegedp:137 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Wolfram F. Richter & Lars Kunze, 2011. "Taxing Human Capital Efficiently when Qualified Labour is Mobile," CESifo Working Paper Series 3366, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Wolfram F. Richter & Berthold U. Wigger, 2012. "Besteuerung des Humanvermögens," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 13(1-2), pages 82-102, 02.
  8. Wolfram F. Richter, 2011. "Efficient Education Policy - A Second-Order Elasticity Rule," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 67(1), pages 1-7, March.
  9. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2014. "Education Policies and Taxation without Commitment," Working Papers 14-16, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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