Fiscal Rules in Economic Crisis: The Trade-off Between Consolidation and Recovery, from a European Perspective
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DOI: 10.1515/econ-2021-0013
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More about this item
Keywords
fiscal rules; consolidation; crisis;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H68 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
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