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Concessions and Repression in Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Ishihara Akifumi

    (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan)

  • Singh Prakarsh

    (Department of Economics, Amherst College, 306B Converse Hall, Amherst, MA, USA)

Abstract

We build a model for predicting civil wars where the government bargains with a rebel group using concessions and repression. The equilibrium is either a state of perpetual peace where there are concessions but no repression or a state of repressive equilibrium that can lead to civil wars. At the lowest levels of political competition, a move towards open electoral participation decreases the ability of the state to use repression to limit challengers, increasing the likelihood of war. At higher levels, an increase in competition decreases the probability of war by increasing concessions to the rebel group. Increasing concessions makes war less likely because it decreases the spoils of war and provides one explanation for the non-monotonicity found between probability of civil war and democracy. We test the prediction of this non-linearity using the technique in [Hansen (2000). “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 68:575–603] and find evidence consistent with the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Ishihara Akifumi & Singh Prakarsh, 2016. "Concessions and Repression in Conflict," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 865-899, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:16:y:2016:i:2:p:865-899:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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