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Electric Shock: The 2012 India Blackout and Public Confidence in Politicians

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  • Brian Blankenship
  • Johannes Urpelainen

Abstract

How do disruptions in basic public service delivery shape people’s perceptions of politicians? We offer evidence from the July 2012 blackout in India, the largest in human history. Using data from the India Human Development Survey, we compare confidence in politicians between households that were surveyed during the outage and affected by it (treatment) and only days before it (control). Balance statistics show that the treatment and control groups are statistically indistinguishable, and further tests indicate that there was no disturbance to the pattern of surveying. Far from undermining public confidence in politicians, the outage increased it, as citizens reacted to the anxiety created by the crisis. The implications are normatively troubling, as politicians seem to have reaped benefits from disruptions in public service delivery. 基本公共服務提供的中斷如何影響人們對政客的看法？ 我們提供了2012年7月印度大停電的證據，這是人類歷史上最大的停電。 使用來自印度人類發展調查的數據，我們比較了在停電期間接受調查且受其影響（處理）和僅受其影響前幾天（控制）的家庭之間對政客的信心。 平衡統計數據表明，治療組和對照組在統計學上是無法區分的，進一步的測試表明，調查模式沒有受到干擾。 停電並沒有損害公眾對政客的信心，反而增加了停電，因為公民對危機造成的焦慮做出了反應。 這在規範上令人不安，因為政治人物似乎從公共服務提供的中斷中獲得了收益。 ¿Cómo influyen las interrupciones en la prestación de servicios públicos básicos en las percepciones de los políticos sobre las personas? Ofrecemos evidencia del apagón de julio de 2012 en India, el más grande en la historia humana. Utilizando datos de la Encuesta de Desarrollo Humano de India, comparamos la confianza en los políticos entre los hogares que fueron encuestados durante el corte y afectados por él (tratamiento) y solo unos días antes (control). Las estadísticas de equilibrio muestran que los grupos de tratamiento y control son estadísticamente indistinguibles, y las pruebas adicionales indican que no hubo alteraciones en el patrón de la encuesta. Lejos de socavar la confianza del público en los políticos, el apagón lo aumentó, ya que los ciudadanos reaccionaron a la ansiedad creada por la crisis. Las implicaciones son normativamente problemáticas, ya que los políticos parecen haber obtenido beneficios de las interrupciones en la prestación de servicios públicos.

Suggested Citation

  • Brian Blankenship & Johannes Urpelainen, 2020. "Electric Shock: The 2012 India Blackout and Public Confidence in Politicians," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 37(4), pages 464-490, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:revpol:v:37:y:2020:i:4:p:464-490
    DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12380
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