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Conflict and Trade in a Predator/Prey Economy

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  • Charles H. Anderton

Abstract

Predatory possibilities are integrated with production and trade in a hawk/dove model. The model shows how mutually beneficial exchange can subdue hawk playing. It also identifies conditions under which predatory possibilities are so large that hawks dominate the economy. One of the unusual results of the model is nullifying productivity growth, whereby increases in the productivity of each agent, in its area of comparative advantage, causes production and per capita welfare to fall under certain conditions. Productivity increases that lead to nullifying growth occur just before a transition cusp that, if reached, vaults the economy to a dramatically improved state.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles H. Anderton, 2003. "Conflict and Trade in a Predator/Prey Economy," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 15-29, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:7:y:2003:i:1:p:15-29
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9361.00172
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Vulnerable Trade: The Dark Side of an Edgeworth Box," Working Papers 0411, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    2. Hassani-Mahmooei, Behrooz & Parris, Brett W., 2013. "Resource scarcity, effort allocation and environmental security: An agent-based theoretical approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 183-192.
    3. Raul Caruso, 2004. "A Trade Institution as a Peaceful Institution?," Others 0406003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 May 2005.
    4. Anderton, Charles H. & Carter, John R., 2008. "Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 422-432, November.
    5. Karnatak, Rajat & Ramaswamy, Ram & Feudel, Ulrike, 2014. "Conjugate coupling in ecosystems: Cross-predation stabilizes food webs," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 48-57.
    6. Charles Anderton, 2000. "Exchange of goods or exchange of blows? New directions in conflict and exchange," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 55-71.
    7. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    8. Rogers, Douglas B. & Smith, Adam C. & Wilson, Bart J., 2013. "Violence, access, and competition in the market for protection," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 1-17.
    9. Kamin, Katrin, 2022. "Bilateral trade and conflict heterogeneity: The impact of conflict on trade revisited," Kiel Working Papers 2222, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    10. Korkut Alp Ertürk, 2011. "Governance and Asymmetric Power," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Dmitry Kucharavy & Eric Schenk & Roland de Guio, 2009. "Long-Run Forecasting of Emerging Technologies with Logistic Models and Growth of Knowledge," Post-Print halshs-00440438, HAL.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General

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