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Homogeneous Models and Heterogeneous Voters

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  • John Bartle

Abstract

Most models assume that voting behaviour can be summarised by a single additive equation. There are good reasons, however, for believing that some voters place more weight on some considerations than others or use different decision rules. In both cases, a single additive equation will produce misleading accounts of the causal processes. Modellers should therefore allow for such differences. In order to illustrate these propositions, I examine evidence from the 2001 British Election Study, which suggests that some voters place more weight on leaders than others. I end by calling for attention to shift from causal complexity to causal diversity.

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  • John Bartle, 2005. "Homogeneous Models and Heterogeneous Voters," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 53(4), pages 653-675, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:53:y:2005:i:4:p:653-675
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00550.x
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    1. Bean, Clive & Mughan, Anthony, 1989. "Leadership Effects in Parliamentary Elections in Australia and Britain," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1165-1179, December.
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    7. André Blais & Elisabeth Gidengil & Neil Nevitte & Richard Nadeau, 2004. "Do (Some) Canadian Voters Punish a Prime Minister for Calling a Snap Election?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52, pages 307-323, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Butt, 2006. "How Voters Evaluate Economic Competence: A Comparison between Parties In and Out of Power," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 54(4), pages 743-766, December.
    2. Wagner, Aiko & Lichteblau, Josephine, 2022. "Germany Going Postal? Comparing Postal and Election Day Voters in the 2017 German Federal Election," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 602-625.

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