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Optimal Electoral Timing: Exercise Wisely and You May Live Longer

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Author Info
Jussi Keppo (IOE Department, University of Michigan)
Lones Smith (Economics Department, University of Michigan)
Dmitry Davydov (Equities Division, Goldman Sachs)

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Abstract

In many democratic countries, the timing of elections is flexible. We explore this potentially valuable option using insights from option pricing in finance. The paper offers three main contributions on this problem. First, we derive a rationally-based mean-reverting political support process for the parties, assuming that politically heterogeneous voters continuously learn over time about evolving party fortunes. We solve for the long-run density for this process and derive the polling process from it by adding polling noise. Second, we explore optimal timing using the political support process. The incumbent sees its poll support, and must call an election within five years of the last election to maximize its expected total time in office. This resembles the optimal exercise rule for an American financial option. This option is recursive, and the waiting and stopping values subtly interact. We prove the existence of the optimal exercise rule in this setting, and show that the expected longevity is a convex-thenconcave function of the political support. Our model is tractable enough that we can analytically derive how the exercise rule responds to parametric shifts. We calibrate our model to the Labour-Tory rivalry in the U.K., with polling data from 1943-2005 and the 16 elections after 1945. Excluding three elections essentially forced by weak governments, our maximizing story quite well explains when the elections were called, and beats simple linear regressions. We also measure the value of election options, finding that over the long run they should more than double the expected time in power of a fixed term electoral cycle.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1565.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1565

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Related research
Keywords: American option; European option; Brownian motion; Electoral timing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  5. Smith, Lones, 1997. "Time-consistent optimal stopping," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 277-279, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. André Blais & Elisabeth Gidengil & Neil Nevitte & Richard Nadeau, 2004. "Do (Some) Canadian Voters Punish a Prime Minister for Calling a Snap Election?," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 52, pages 307-323, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Keller, Godfrey & Rady, Sven, 1999. "Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 475-507, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
    Other versions:
    • Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  10. Cochrane, John H, 1996. "A Cross-Sectional Test of an Investment-Based Asset Pricing Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(3), pages 572-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Felix Bierbrauer & Lydia Mechtenberg, 2008. "Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2008-071, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Felix Bierbrauer & Lydia Mechtenberg, 2008. "Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_50, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
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