Die “Geiselhaft” des Relationship‐Intermediärs: Eine Nachlese zur Beinahe‐Insolvenz des Holzmann‐Konzerns

When the Philipp Holzmann corporation declared insolvency many professional observers suggested that the German constructor had fallen victim to the operation of `Germany Inc.'. This metaphor meant to blame the close ties between Deutsche Bank and Holzmann as the ultimate reason for the insolvency of Holzmann. This paper challenges the notion that the relationship between Deutsche Bank and Holzmann exemplified `Germany Inc.' and that this was the systemic reason for the disaster. It argues instead that the close connection describes relationship intermediation. Relationship intermediation and bank‐dominated corporate control are two sides of the same coin. Like any other form of corporate governance, the bank‐dominated variant is not immune against loss of corporate control. In the case of Holzmann, successful relationship intermediation over a long time has presumably prepared the ground for the bank management to remove Holzmann from its main investor's tight control. In such a disastrous situation and after the total loss of control, it seems natural to liquidate the firm and to pay out the investors. But in this particular case, politicians and the media were reluctant and ultimately refused to apply the rules of investor protection. This experience is likely to impair banks’ incentive to invest in relationship intermediation if they anticipate that relationship intermediation bears the risk of losing part or all of their formal investor rights. This would have a negative impact on both the banks’ readiness to finance firms and the banks’ participation in restructuring distressed firms.