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Majority Rules in Constitutional Referendums

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  • Stephan Michel
  • Ignacio N. Cofone

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  • Stephan Michel & Ignacio N. Cofone, 2017. "Majority Rules in Constitutional Referendums," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 402-424, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:3:p:402-424
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/kykl.12143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laruelle,Annick & Valenciano,Federico, 2011. "Voting and Collective Decision-Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521182638.
    2. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Incomplete Social Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(1), pages 38-67, March.
    3. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(2), pages 565-611.
    4. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S, 1994. "Direct-Democratic Rules: The Role of Discussion," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 341-354.
    5. Lorenz Blume & Jens Müller & Stefan Voigt, 2009. "The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 431-461, September.
    6. Caplin, Andrew S & Nalebuff, Barry J, 1988. "On 64%-Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 787-814, July.
    7. John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Direct Democracy Works," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 185-206, Spring.
    8. Dimi Jottier & John Ashworth & Bruno Heyndels, 2012. "Understanding Voters' Preferences: How the Electorate's Complexity Affects Prediction Accuracy and Wishful Thinking among Politicians with Respect to Election Outcomes," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 340-370, August.
    9. Lars P. Feld & Marcel R. Savioz, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-538, November.
    10. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    11. Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-538.
    12. Hans Gersbach, 2011. "On the limits of democracy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(2), pages 201-217, July.
    13. Bård Harstad, 2005. "Majority Rules and Incentives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1535-1568.
    14. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoichi Hizen, 2021. "A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(1), pages 19-47, February.
    2. David Stadelmann & Marco Portmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2018. "Military Service of Politicians, Public Policy, and Parliamentary Decisions," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(4), pages 639-666.
    3. Guillermo Larrain & Gabriel Negretto & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "How not to write a constitution: lessons from Chile," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 233-247, March.

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