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Resale Price Maintenance In Two‐Sided Markets

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  • Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen
  • Bjørn Olav Johansen
  • Teis Lunde Lømo

Abstract

We consider competing two‐sided platforms selling directly to one side of the market, and through an agent to the other side. Platforms offer nonlinear tariffs, and can choose whether to contract with the same or different agents. We study the platforms’ incentives to impose resale price maintenance (RPM), and the effect on end customers. We find that, even if customers on both sides value each other's participation, platforms impose minimum RPM to raise prices on both sides simultaneously if platform competition is sufficiently strong. In a linear demand example, we find that overall welfare decreases with minimum prices and increases with maximum prices.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Bjørn Olav Johansen & Teis Lunde Lømo, 2018. "Resale Price Maintenance In Two‐Sided Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 570-609, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:66:y:2018:i:3:p:570-609
    DOI: 10.1111/joie.12182
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2021. "Multi-Product Pricing and Minimum Resale Price Maintenance," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242338, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Kind, Hans Jarle & Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars, 2016. "Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 101-112.
    3. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus & Wey, Christian, 2023. "Resale price maintenance in a successive monopoly model," DICE Discussion Papers 395, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Lømo, Teis Lunde & Meland, Frode & Sandvik, Håvard Mork, 2020. "Do slotting allowances reduce product variety?," Working Papers in Economics 7/20, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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