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Pricing and Commitment by Two-Sided Platforms

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  • Andrei Hagiu
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    Abstract

    In many markets, including payment cards and telecommunications, service providers operate networks that support customer transactions with each other. When the two sides of a transaction belong to more than one network in common, the question arises as to which network will carry the transaction. We show that the answer depends on a combination of who has the formal authority to choose and the parties' network subscription decisions. Our central finding is that granting formal authority to one side of the market can increase the extent to which transactions run over the network preferred by the other side of the market. We also characterize competing networks' equilibrium choices of routing rules and prices. Ordering information: This article can be ordered from http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi?action=buy&year=2006&issue=aut&page=720&tid=30492&sc=1869P1N9 .

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 37 (2006)
    Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
    Pages: 720-737

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    Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:720-737

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    Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

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    Cited by:
    1. Galeotti, Andrea & Moraga-González, José Luis, 2009. "Platform intermediation in a market for differentiated products," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 417-428, May.
    2. Kai Suelzle, 2004. "Duopolistic Competition between Independent and Collaborative Business-to-Business Marketplaces," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 191, Econometric Society.
    3. Rasch, Alexander & Wenzel, Tobias, 2013. "Piracy in a two-sided software market," DICE Discussion Papers 85, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2010. "The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 222-55, May.
    5. Chokri Aloui & Khaïreddine Jebsi, 2010. "Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 57(4), pages 423-439, December.
    6. Zhou, Yiyi, 2012. "Failure to Launch in Two-Sided Markets: A Study of the U.S. Video Game Market," MPRA Paper 42002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Antoine Martin & Michael Orlando, 2007. "Barriers to network-specific investment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 705-728, October.
    8. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2011. "Price Discrimination in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Discussion Papers 1540, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Deltas, George & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2007. "Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1190-1212, December.
    10. Alessandro Pavan & Renato Gomes, 2011. "Many-to-Many Matching Design and Price Discrimination," 2011 Meeting Papers 1212, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Hagiu, Andrei & Jullien, Bruno, 2007. "Designing a Two-Sided Platform: When To Increase Search Costs?," IDEI Working Papers 473, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    12. Reisinger, Markus, 2010. "Unique Equilibrium in Two-Part Tariff Competition between Two-Sided Platforms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 308, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    13. Hagiu, Andrei, 2009. "Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search?," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3f34c5dk, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    14. Robin S. Lee & Tim Wu, 2009. "Subsidizing Creativity through Network Design: Zero-Pricing and Net Neutrality," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 61-76, Summer.

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