Merger, Ease Of Entry And Entry Deterrence In A Dynamic Model
AbstractWe analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti-competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. On the other hand, if entry of new firms becomes less costly, firms may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. We also show that when the incumbent can engage in entry deterrence activities, anti-merger policy can decrease welfare. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 54 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (09)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008.
"A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization,"
2008-005, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization," Discussion Paper 2008-22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller, 2014.
"Do horizontal mergers induce entry? Evidence from the US airline industry,"
Applied Economics Letters,
Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 31-34, January.
- Bougette, Patrice & Hüschelrath, Kai & Müller, Kathrin, 2013. "Do horizontal mergers induce entry? Evidence from the US airline industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 13-030, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- Robin Mason & Helen Weeds, 2007.
"Merger Policy, Entry, and Entrepreneurship,"
Economics Discussion Papers
634, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2007. "Downstream Mergers And Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.