The impact of power market structure on CO2 cost pass-through to electricity prices under quantity competition – A theoretical approach
AbstractWe present a theoretical analysis of the impact of power market structure on the pass-through rate (PTR) of CO2 emissions trading (ET) costs on electricity prices. Market structure refers in particular to the number of firms active in the market and the intensity of oligopolistic competition as measured by the conjectural variation, as well as to the functional form of the power demand and supply curves. In addition, we analyse briefly the impact of other power market-related factors on the PTR of carbon costs to electricity prices. These include in particular the impact of ET-induced changes in the merit order of power generation technologies and the impact of pursuing other market strategies besides maximising generator profit, such as maximising market shares or sales revenues of power companies. Each of these factors can have a significant impact on the rate of passing-through carbon costs to electricity prices.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco
Emissions trading; Carbon costs pass-through; Electric power; Market power; Electricity prices; Demand elasticity;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
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