Vertical Integration, Variable Proportions and Successive Oligopolies
AbstractThis paper investigates the problem of how the effect of vertical integration upon the final product price is related to the production and/or market structures. Some ambiguous results of the previous models are shown to involve the compound effect of vertical an d horizontal merger. This model considers purely vertical integration and shows that the (Lerner) index of monopoly remains unaffected before and after merger. Vertical integration is shown accordingly to yield an unambiguous decrease in the final product price-an increase in consumer welfare. Implications for antitrust laws are also discussed. Copyright 1988 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821
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- Li, Haizheng & Luo, Jifeng, 2008. "Industry consolidation and price in the US linerboard industry," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 93-115, April.
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